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Introduction
In many respects, Bosnia-Herzegovina is a 
paradigmatic case of a liberal peace-style 
international intervention, aimed to ensure 
stability by building effective democratic 
and economic governance and by promot-
ing societal reconciliation. Anchored in 
the General Framework Agreement for Peace 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina that ended the 
1992–1995 war, international interven-
tion has avoided a reversion to violence and 
enabled most of the population to begin 
rebuilding their lives. The constitution estab-
lished as part of the Agreement has imple-
mented territorial separation along ethnic 
lines and human rights protection standards 
that have guarded against a resumption of 
community violence in line with the liberal 
view of security through effective democratic 
state institutions (Philipsen 2014). Although 
the absence of widespread violence over the 
past two decades can be credited to this for-
mula, Bosnia-Herzegovina’s political body 
has been beset by demands—particularly 
from Bosnian Serbs and Croats—for more 
territorial autonomy; an occurrence which 
has also preoccupied the reform efforts over-
seen by international actors. These groups 
justify their demands by a claim that only 
rule by one’s own (ethnic) people can pro-
vide protection and security following a war 
that turned the three constituent peoples 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina against each other. 
Thus, in the Bosnian post-war context, eth-
nic identity has been securitised and the 
country’s ethno-national political elites—
who still command a strong following—have 
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The international intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina was intended to support 
conflict resolution by introducing territorial self-government and power sharing 
as the foundation for a governance framework that would provide for collective 
and individual security alignment over time. Instead, it has contributed to the 
ethnification of security whereby collective security in the form of an ‘ethnified 
state’ remains at the forefront of political discourse and practice. Social acceptance 
of this ethnified state as the guarantor of security—despite the fading reality of 
the ethnic threat in public perceptions of post-war insecurity—has been actively 
manufactured by the country’s ethnic elites using the very institutional means 
put in place by the international intervention. The result is an ‘ethnic security 
paradox’ in which the idea of individual safety—linked to the protection of ethnic 
identity in the form of an ethnified state—unsettles both collective and individual 
security alike. 
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identified ‘ethnic security’ as the axis of polit-
ical discourse and action (Haynes 2008; Beha 
& Visoka 2010). While this can be expected 
in the case of ethno-national parties ideo-
logically committed to the notion of secu-
rity as the protection of ethnic identity, it is 
ominous that some nominally civic political 
parties have also embraced the idea of ethnic 
security in one form or another (McClelland 
2013; Azinovic et al. 2011; Saferworld 2012). 
This suggests that, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
ethnic security has become the social reality. 
The main goal of this article is to concep-
tualise the relationship between (the idea of) 
collective and individual security as a result of 
the liberal peace intervention, using Bosnia- 
Herzegovina as an illustration. I submit that 
the relationship between the idea of security 
as protection of ethnic identity and individual 
security is manifested as an ‘ethnic security 
paradox’. Collective security in the form of 
an ethnified state should be accepted socially 
despite the pervasive individual insecurity 
that afflicts every citizen when ethnicity is 
instrumentalised and ethnic security is used 
as a political tool. When ethnicity becomes 
the main organising principle of politics and 
the ‘all dominant social marker’, it affects the 
exercise of public authority by introducing 
arbitrariness and unpredictability (Simonsen 
2005: 298). Consequently, every individual, 
regardless of their ethnicity, is affected by the 
manner in which power is exercised (Dyrstad 
2012; Simonsen 2005; Bojicic-Dzelilovic 
2013). Furthermore, this paradox—whereby 
the idea of individual safety unsettles and 
compromises both collective and individual 
security—operates against the fading reality 
of the ethnic threat in peoples’ perceptions 
of what makes life secure. These perceptions 
have increasingly—albeit with some variation 
particularly between rural and urban areas, 
and to some degree among ethnic groups—
coalesced around the priorities of livelihood 
and welfare (Efendic et al. 2014a; BTI 2014; 
Saferworld 2012; Haynes 2008). The early 
2014 cross-ethnic mass protests against dete-
riorating living standards and corruption 
are a good illustration of this. Thus, while 
the social reality makes ethnic fear relevant, 
it is not necessarily perceived as a threat to 
the security of ethnic groups in the sense of 
direct violence. Were that so, it would pro-
vide some foundation for the ethnic security 
discourse promoted by ethno-national elites, 
and it would also serve as a straightforward 
explanation of the enduring support for 
ethnic parties. Instead, it is a product of the 
combined effects of the discourse and prac-
tice of ethnic elites and everyday experience 
in the institutional context shaped by the 
international intervention.
Before I set out the structure of the paper, 
a caveat is in order. This discussion does not 
attempt to deal with identity politics or the 
effectiveness of power sharing in post-con-
flict divided societies. Rather, it has a much 
narrower and specific focus on how interna-
tional intervention contributes to the pro-
duction of ideas of collective and individual 
security in societies receiving support as well 
as the ‘security gap’ created therein (Kaldor & 
Selchow 2014). 
The discussion moves in four steps. The first 
part assesses liberal peace-style international 
interventions with a specific focus on Bosnia-
Herzegovina before elaborating on the theo-
retical argument with reference to critical 
peace-building scholarship. The second part 
explores the politics of insecurity by inves-
tigating ethnic elite discourse on security 
and political practice. The following section 
explores the everyday experience of post-war 
(in)security and includes a discussion about 
the paradox of ‘ethnic security.’ The final sec-
tion concludes by reflecting on the broader 
conceptual implications of this study with 
respect to the relationship between collec-
tive and individual security (i.e. ‘security gap’) 
in international interventions. 
Liberal Peace Intervention and 
Security Outcomes in  
Bosnia-Herzegovina
The origins of liberal peace-style interna-
tional intervention in post-conflict coun-
tries can be traced to the publication of An 
Agenda for Peace in 1992—commissioned 
Bojicic-Dzelilovic: The Politics, Practice and Paradox of  
‘Ethnic Security’ in Bosnia-Herzegovina
Art. 11, page 3 of 18
by then United Nations Secretary General 
Boutros Boutros Ghali—which explicitly 
introduced post-conflict interventions to 
‘strengthen and solidify peace’ (Paris & Sisk 
2009: 5). The principal security function of 
these international interventions was to sta-
bilise countries emerging from war and to 
prevent a recurrence of armed conflict. It was 
some years later—and against a growing view 
that state weakness and failure were at the 
core of post-Cold War violence—that state 
building took centre stage in both the theory 
and practice of peace-building (Paris & Sisk 
2009; Wolff 2011; Rocha Menocal 2011). The 
result of this shift was their eventual and 
problematic conflation (Call & Wyeth 2008). 
The understanding that the state was often 
responsible for human rights violations, 
humanitarian catastrophes and economic 
mismanagement led to arguments that the 
mandate of international actors should be 
to build effective systems and institutions 
of governance, i.e. the liberal state (Paris 
2004; Paris & Sisk 2009; Philipsen 2014). 
Using institutions as the main tool in post-
conflict state building, international inter-
ventions have attempted their construction 
and consolidation across an expanding range 
of areas including good governance, human 
rights, rule of law, democracy and market 
economy. The underlying rationale is that 
stable society is unlikely to emerge without 
these institutions and their apparatuses 
(Bojicic-Dzelilovic et al. 2014).
In terms of liberal peace logic, a minimum 
level of security (i.e. the absence of direct 
physical violence) is needed to successfully 
build state institutions. According to Stefan 
Wolff, ‘security first is an accepted para-
digm of state building’ (Wolff 2011: 1779). 
Although a liberal peace-style international 
intervention reflects a narrow understand-
ing of security—and its priority is short term 
stabilisation in post-conflict zones—at the 
same time it recognises the importance of 
security for the legitimacy of institutions, 
which is a necessary precondition for insti-
tutional consolidation, effectiveness and the 
achievement of stable peace. Hence, Wolff 
posits, ‘institution building…provides the 
link between a security based on coercive 
capacity (of domestic and/or external actors) 
to a security that derives from rule of law’, 
namely a security bestowed by universal and 
non-discriminatory rules and their effective 
enforcement (Wolff 2011: 1780). Therefore, 
the choice of institutional arrangement is 
critical in post-conflict societies whose exist-
ing institutions have been transformed by 
the experience of war (Bastian & Luckham 
2003; Paris 2004; Wolff 2011). 
If a choice of institutional arrangements 
in post-conflict divided societies is critical 
for both collective and individual security 
outcomes, then the question of the nature 
of societal division in a post-war country is 
paramount. The answer is inevitably linked 
to the prevailing understanding of the causes 
of a particular conflict and its drivers. In 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, the international com-
munity sided with the view—supported by 
a robust body of scholarship—that the con-
flict was about inter-ethnic violence rooted 
in a history of ethnic hatred. This thinking 
was strongly attuned to the security dilemma 
logic, according to which, very crudely, eth-
nic identities are fixed and irreconcilable and 
require a redrawing of the map (Xu 2012; 
Jeffrey 2013: 69; Jenne 2012). By embracing 
an ethnic conflict view, international actors 
adopted the security discourse generated by 
local ethnic parties (Hansen 2006; Campbell 
1998). These were the same political parties 
that had led Bosnia-Herzegovina to war by 
inciting ethnic fear through a combination of 
inflammatory rhetoric and violent practice. 
Ultimately, these parties defined both the 
context and content of peace negotiations 
that culminated in the signing of the General 
Framework Agreement. The ‘Dayton for-
mula’ of territorial self-government and 
power sharing pursued stability and security 
through territorial and institutional separa-
tion with an explicit focus on the pivotal role 
of elites in building the state. In line with 
the liberal peace and state-centric concep-
tions of security, decentralization on ethnic 
principles was conceived as a form of statist 
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security and therefore as the principal con-
flict management tool. With the stroke of a 
pen, the country was divided into entities, 
cantons and municipalities around more or 
less homogenous ethnic territories carved 
out by brutal acts of violence. The consti-
tutional categorisation of minorities from 
among the three constituent peoples—hith-
erto unknown in Bosnia-Herzegovina, or for 
that matter in former Yugoslavia—was intro-
duced in recognition of ‘new demographic 
realities’ (Pickering 2007). The protection of 
minority rights via an elaborate set of legal 
and institutional mechanisms was built into 
Bosnia-Herzegovina’s institutions under the 
premise it would guarantee security. The 
fact that fear of becoming a minority was 
an important factor behind the mobilisation 
for conflict—and one only sharpened by the 
experience of war—was overlooked (Kostic 
2007; Podunavac 2013). Of course, the impli-
cation of recognising minorities was that the 
majority group was given the right to control 
the state (Pickering 2007: 8). By opting for 
the constitutional arrangement of Bosnia-
Herzegovina around a three-way ethnic divi-
sion, essentialist ideas about ethnicity, which 
Caroline Hughes calls an ‘ethnicised view of 
war’, carried into an ‘ethnicised view of peace’ 
in ‘which stability is achieved initially by the 
engineering of institutions to create partic-
ular ethnic balances; and in which stability 
subsequently gives way to “good governance” 
via a process of capacity building designed to 
help those institutions over the long term 
to elevate themselves from the ethnic fray’ 
(Hughes 2011: 1493–1494). The General 
Framework Agreement’s coupling of territo-
rial separation and a multi-ethnic state— the 
latter to be recreated by the right to refugee 
return stipulated in the Agreement’s Annex 
VII—was grounded in this logic. According to 
this logic, individual and collective security 
would eventually align and allow the citizens 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina to avoid discrimina-
tion regardless of their identity and be free to 
live and make their livelihoods wherever they 
chose. This would be the minimum require-
ment for individual safety in accordance with 
the liberal project of governing through free-
dom (Newman 2011). 
In reality, neither the minority nor majority 
are free in a sense of enjoying the protection 
of a rule-governed state. In post-war Bosnia-
Herzegovina, the organisation of political 
life, economy, media, security structures, 
health, education and social interactions has 
moved along ethnic lines. The institutional 
frameworks in place have been conducive 
to a comprehensive separation of identi-
ties within imagined ‘ethnic security zones’ 
(Haynes 2008). In other words, international 
intervention has facilitated the development 
of institutional means to articulate the idea 
of ethnic security. In the critical scholarship 
on peace-building, both the external vision 
of security and the preoccupation with 
institutional performance salient in the lib-
eral peace paradigm have been extensively 
debated (Newman 2011). The experience of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina as one of the first coun-
tries where this type of international inter-
vention was deployed has bolstered many of 
the most ardent critiques of the liberal peace 
thesis (Berdal 2009; Gromes 2009; Richmond 
2011; Chandler 2010; Cooper et al. 2011). A 
great deal of attention has focused on how 
the institutional architecture erected by the 
General Framework Agreement incentivised 
exclusive ethnic politics and ‘ethnic outbid-
ding.’ In this tradition, the endurance of eth-
nic identity politics is primarily explained 
through the role of institutional incentives 
in shaping and hardening ethnic identities. 
While the preceding discussion clearly dem-
onstrates the importance of institutional 
incentives to ethnic identity politics, it is not 
sufficient to account for the ‘ethnic secu-
rity paradox’ in Bosnia-Herzegovina nor the 
link between instrumental uses of ethnic 
identity politics and the social acceptance 
that is behind it. Furthermore, it offers no 
pathway to understand why—although in 
peoples’ perception ethnic fear is not a fore-
most concern—this form of manipulation by 
ethnic elites is possible. I suggest that the 
critical peace-building scholarship could 
be enriched by recognising security as an 
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institutionally, discursively and socially con-
stituted practice and individual security as 
collectively produced (Bubant 2005; Kaldor 
& Selchow 2014). Inquiry should not focus 
solely, or even primarily, on institutions but 
rather on the interplay of these three dimen-
sions in the context of international inter-
vention. This will facilitate a better grasp 
of how international intervention helps 
produce a particular relationship between 
collective and individual security. The theo-
retical premise of this article is that in the 
context of an international intervention, 
security outcomes—including the relation-
ship between collective and individual secu-
rity—are not only defined by institutional 
designs but also by institutional interaction 
with elite discourse and practice; therefore, 
the everyday experience of security is deci-
sive. The following two sections apply and 
develop this framework by using empirical 
evidence from Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
Politics of Security: Discourse and 
Political Action
Since 1995, the three ethno-national par-
ties—the Party of Democratic Action 
(SDA), the Croatian Democratic Union of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina (HDZ BiH) and the 
Serb Democratic Party (SDS), representing 
Bosniaks, Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs 
respectively—have remained active and influ-
ential despite pluralisation which has dimin-
ished their popularity since the lead up to 
war and its immediate aftermath. Except for a 
brief period (2000–2002) when the Alliance 
for Change—a ten party coalition led by the 
Social Democratic Party (SDP)—formed the 
government, all three ethno-national parties 
have continued to exert political influence at 
various levels (Figure 1).
To interpret the above data, a further 
detail about the 2010 election results is 
important. While both the SDA and the 
HDZ BiH have split to create two distinct 
parties—the Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(SBiH) and the HDZ1990 respectively—the 
SDS was challenged in 2006 by the Party of 
the Independent Social Democrats (SNSD), 
the strongest social democratic party in 
Republika Srpska (the Bosnian Serb entity). 
Since then, the SNSD has been a ruling 
political party in Republika Srpska. From 
2010–2014, it enjoyed an absolute majority 
at the entity level and governed in coalition 
with the SDS at the state level. Although its 
popularity had declined, the SNSD won the 
mandate to form an entity government in 
the 2014 general election. Importantly, the 
SNSD removed the SDS from power on a 
radical nationalist platform, which has hard-
ened over the years with respect to ethnic 
security claims. This was framed as punish-
ment of the SDS for its alleged cooperation 
in building central state institutions with 
its non-Serb political counterparts from 
the Federation (Bosnia-Herzegovina’s other 
entity) and the international community. The 
period 2000–2006 saw the implementation 
of key reforms—under strong international 
pressure—to strengthen both the central 
state and multi-level government system. In 
the lead up to the 2006 election, one of the 
most prominent items on the SNSD electoral 
agenda concerned the 2004 apology from 
the Republika Srpska SDS-led government to 
the victims of the Srebrenica massacre. 
Since the SBiH and the HDZ1990 are both 
nationalist in their ideology, and the SNSD—
despite its formal social democratic creden-
tials—has become more radical than the 
SDS, politics in Bosnia-Herzegovina are over-
whelmingly defined by parties that espouse 
an ethno-national political agenda. It is these 
Figure 1: Elections to the Bosnia-Herzego-
vina House of Representatives, 1996–2014. 
Source: BHCEC 2015.
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parties that speak in the name of security for 
their respective ethnic groups, unchallenged 
in any meaningful sense by weak politi-
cal opposition and divided civil society, and 
propped up by an increasingly politically-
controlled media. 
The agency of ethno-national elites is the 
key to understanding the ‘ethnic security par-
adox’. This can be credited to their engage-
ment in what Nils Bubant calls the active 
manufacture of ‘ontological uncertainty’, 
defined as ‘socially constructed anxiety that 
shapes pertinent kinds of danger, fears and 
concerns for a particular community at a par-
ticular time’ (Bubant 2005: 277). In Bosnia-
Herzegovina, ethno-national elites have been 
instrumental in maintaining the idea of eth-
nic security and its institutionalized exploi-
tation in the context of a three-way ethnic 
division of power. These parties define the 
foremost security threat to be against eth-
nic identity and therefore focus primarily on 
the protection of this identity. This emphasis 
evokes the issue of territory as illustrated by 
the following comment from Milorad Dodik, 
the SNSD head:
We should live in the same place and 
no one should eliminate the other…but 
they [Bosniaks] have to have theirs and 
we [Serbs] have ours [state] and only 
that is the way we can live normally, 
one beside the other (Kostovicova & 
Bojicic-Dzelilovic 2014: 199). 
During the implementation of the General 
Framework Agreement, the political action 
of ethno-national parties has relied on eth-
nic identity as well as social and territorial 
borders. The evocation of ethnic differences 
and territorial control has been used to influ-
ence the execution of numerous reforms to 
build the central Bosnia-Herzegovina state. 
Analysing the strategy employed by ethno-
nationalist elites, Dino Abazovic argues that 
political pluralism represents ‘one party…one 
religion, one nation, and political and terri-
torial exclusivity and hegemony on at least 
one part of Bosnia-Herzegovina’ (Abazovic 
et al. 2007: 10). Since the launch of interna-
tional intervention, the main ethno-national 
parties have defied the logic of liberal peace-
building and its promise of security through 
democratic institutions. They have worked 
actively to preserve the war-induced sym-
bolic, institutional and territorial divisions 
of which they are the key beneficiaries. 
Moreover, they have been unintentionally 
endorsed by international actors despite 
their detrimental effect on citizen security in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
Since war’s end, the most inflammatory 
narratives of ethnic interest protection have 
emerged around elections and various delib-
erations over key reforms. Much of this con-
troversy concerns the reallocation of power 
among different levels of government and 
its interference with the ethno-nationalist 
ideology of political self-rule. The discourse 
of ethnic interest protection—particularly 
among Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat 
political elites—has visibly radicalised since 
2006, following the failed attempt to reform 
police forces and strengthen the central state 
through constitutional change. This shift 
occurred during the presidential campaigns 
of Dodik and Haris Silajdzic (leader of the 
pro-Bosniak SBiH). Silajdzic ran on a platform 
of ‘100% Bosnia-Herzegovina’, i.e. a unified 
country without entities. His campaign was 
set against the decision of the International 
Criminal Court that the 1995 Srebrenica mas-
sacre was a genocide; a judgment which—
according to Silajdzic’s formulation—made 
Republika Srpska ‘a genocide construction’. 
Meanwhile, Dodik’s position was to call for 
secession of Republika Srpska from Bosnia-
Herzegovina. This is just one example of the 
aggressive and defensive nationalism present 
in the discourse of ethnic elites; a dynamic 
that is replicated in, and resonates with, 
everyday practice at the grassroots level. 
Bolstered by local trends, the radicalisation 
of political discourse has been caused by the 
disengagement of international actors from 
the implementation of the peace agreement. 
This reduction of international presence 
and leadership was justified by claims that 
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there should be greater local involvement 
in this process (Azinovic et al. 2011; Martin 
et al. 2012). Arguably, as the main source of 
fear underpinning uncertainty and its effect 
on the relationship between collective and 
individual security, these two dynamics have 
contributed to the perpetuation of post-war 
insecurity.
Following the 2009 European Court of 
Human Rights verdict that required Bosnia-
Herzegovina to grant equal political repre-
sentation to groups other than the three 
constitutive peoples (i.e. ‘Sejdic-Finci’ case), 
Bosnian Serb and the Bosnian Croat ethno-
national elites have increasingly unified in 
their scepticism of state viability. The SNSD’s 
main goal is to preserve the current territo-
rial borders and powers of Republika Srpska 
under the General Framework Agreement. 
As a representative of the Bosnian Croat 
political body, the HDZ BiH aims to achieve 
more political and territorial autonomy 
within Federation territory via the establish-
ment of a third Bosnian Croat entity. Despite 
its support for a unified Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
the SDA—as the strongest of the Bosnian 
ethno-national parties—harbours aspirations 
for Bosniak preeminence achieved through 
a programme of constitutional reform. This 
struggle for territorial and political recon-
figuration has sent ripples across other levels 
of government and is manifest in repeated 
demands to redraw municipal borders along 
ethnic lines. At face value, this supports the 
claims of those scholars who cite ethnicity as 
one of the key factors causing the outbreak 
of war (Weidmann 2011).
Dodik and the SNSD have spearheaded 
the discourse of ethnic victimhood, threat-
ened secession from Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
and thus rekindled post-war ethnic polariza-
tion. As recently as the October 2014 gen-
eral election, this discourse has escalated to 
an open and continuous denigration of the 
state. In their analysis of hate speech during 
the 2010 general election, Vlado Azinovic 
and colleagues identified several prominent 
themes in this radicalized political discourse: 
the future of the state (its durability and 
desirability); state destruction and secession; 
and the prospect of another war (Azinovic 
et al. 2011: 14). All of these themes were 
present during the October 2014 election 
campaign, prompting comments that—as 
far as party rhetoric was concerned—Bosnia-
Herzegovina is back to the start of the war 
(Kojovic 2014). Another prominent observer 
of Bosnian politics claims this rhetoric is a 
reflection of a deeper problem, which is that:
…the leading nationalist parties have 
not succeeded to genuinely reform 
because they have never aban-
doned their war time ideology and 
goals. […] their attitude towards war 
crimes and ethnic cleansing, as the 
key instigators of a brutal annihila-
tion of others’ ethnic and religious 
identity has not changed to this day 
(Oslobodjenje 2013).
The following comment by Dodik is illus-
trative of anti-state rhetoric that frames 
demands for alternative political arrange-
ments, on the grounds that Republika Srpska 
and the Bosnian Serbs are under collective 
threat, particularly from Bosniaks:
It’s about whether you respect one 
people, whether you strip them force-
fully of their legitimate rights push-
ing them into a position of being an 
object rather than subject of political 
and all other social processes…there 
are quite serious intentions, which is 
less known, to steal and annul iden-
tities. Almost forcibly, be it publicly 
or in a concealed way, the story is 
being pushed through that we are all 
Bosnians (Azinovic et al. 2011: 19).
The prospect of ethnic identity protection 
through the establishment of a territory or 
ethnic state is also reflected in the claims of 
HDZ BiH leader Dragan Covic:
Bosnia has a future exclusively as a 
country of three equal people…all 
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those that think to create it differ-
ently, on a civic concept and a concept 
of a unitary state will absolutely have 
condemned it to collapse (Azinovic et 
al. 2011:15).
The discourse of ethnic identity protection—
i.e. the protection of the rights and privileges 
of a particular ethnic group, with the ‘ethnic 
state’ as its guarantor—is not limited to polit-
ical elites but is also exploited by a range of 
other social actors. War veterans, for exam-
ple, are among the most vocal advocates of 
ethnic homogenisation and political self-
rule. The following extract from an interview 
with Miro Grabovac—founder and long-time 
president of the Bosnian Croat war veterans 
association—illustrates this: 
Bosnia and Herzegovina can be sta-
ble and sustainable only if her three 
constitutive people are sovereign, 
which means that (Bosnian) Croats 
must get their own republic. […] Those 
Bosnian Croat politicians who would 
support the implementation of the 
‘Sejdic-Finci’ verdict, and not settle 
the question of the Bosnian Croats as 
a constitutive people, would be the 
traitors (Grabovac 2013).
It is important to note that for most of the 
post-war period, war veterans have been the 
strongest electoral base for ethnic parties. 
The ideology of political self-rule necessitates 
a requisite set of institutions, which—as dis-
cussed in the previous section—were put in 
place by the General Framework Agreement 
(Gutierrez-Sanin & Wood 2014). Explaining 
ethnicity as a politicized social action, Sinisa 
Malesevic argues that ethnicity is about more 
than cultural and symbolic action, perspec-
tive, discourse or a way of understanding and 
interpreting. In his view, ‘interpretations, 
discourses and perspectives do not float in 
the air but are linked to specific dynamics 
of political, economic and coercive power’ 
for which the existing institutional context 
provides a fertile soil (Malesevic 2010: 78). 
The constant manufacture of ethnic threat 
and inter-ethnic difference by ethno-
national elites is mirrored by political action 
that challenges any reform perceived as dis-
ruptive to existing politico-economic power, 
itself based on the ethno-national division 
of the country. Over time (and particularly 
since 2006), the lack of a defined and con-
sistent international policy towards Bosnia-
Herzegovina has emboldened these forces 
and weakened some of the central state 
institutions erected under international 
oversight. This action includes attempts to 
change the army structure, which had been 
considered one of the most successful inter-
nationally sponsored reforms. Several exam-
ples taken from public discourse illustrate 
the political action underlying ethnic secu-
rity in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Because the implementation of the 
aforementioned ‘Sejdic-Finci’ verdict has 
been blocked for several years, Bosnia-
Herzegovina’s progress towards European 
Union accession has been interrupted. The 
most immediate consequence of this inac-
tion has been the political stalemate in the 
southern town of Mostar. Since 2010, the SDA 
and HDZ BiH disagreement over reorganisa-
tion has blocked the work of both municipal 
and cantonal governments as well as caused 
Mostar to miss municipal elections in 2012. 
The latest proposal calls for the establish-
ment of three ‘Bosniak’ and one ‘Bosnian 
Croat’ municipalities within Mostar (Bjelica-
Sagovnovic 2013). Moreover, a similar pro-
gramme of ethnic reorganisation has been 
proposed in the central Bosnia municipality 
of Travnik (Gudelj 2013). Since 1995, numer-
ous reforms have been deliberately blocked 
or delayed by the parties opposed to rebuild-
ing a unified, multi-ethnic, rule-governed 
state using the very institutions the inter-
national intervention helped put into place. 
The victims of this political strategy are the 
citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina, whose lives 
and livelihoods have suffered because of 
the political and economic mismanagement 
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inherent to the politics of ethnic security. The 
next section examines the social practices 
and everyday experience of security at the 
grassroots level. It explores what makes the 
idea of ethnic security in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
socially acceptable: whether the notion of 
ethnic security—stimulated by concern for 
the protection of ethnic identity—has some 
grounding in the everyday experience of 
ordinary people.
Social Practices and the Everyday 
Experience of Security
Ethnic security discourse is sustainable only 
in so far as it operates in a supportive con-
text shaped by the interplay between institu-
tions and social practices. In the remainder 
of this section, three aspects of insecurity 
are explored in relation to the daily experi-
ence of citizens and their idea of individual 
and collective security: ethnically-motivated 
physical violence as well as institutional and 
symbolic aspects of insecurity. However, 
the everyday experience of (in)security in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina can only be understood 
in relation to the politics of insecurity dis-
cussed above.
In the immediate post-war period, direct 
ethnically-motivated violence—in the form 
of killings, arson attacks, destruction of 
property and religious sites, expulsions, ver-
bal attacks, threats by weapons, stoning, and 
so on—aimed foremost at returning refu-
gees and displaced persons was common 
throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina. Although 
murder rates were small in absolute terms, 
several of these incidents were the subject of 
intense public debate due to the involvement 
of high-ranking local officials. Over time, 
instances of ethnically-motivated aggres-
sion subsided with spikes in violence mir-
roring the political situation. For example, 
the collapse of the 2006 talks on constitu-
tional reform ushered in a period of intensi-
fied political tension which was reflected by 
increased incidences of ethnically-motivated 
violence from 2007–2009. These incidents 
were not systematically recorded but their 
number increased from 7 per month in 2007, 
to 9 in 2008 and 13 in 2009 (Saferworld 
2012: 14). Azinovic reports that 60 intereth-
nic incidents were recorded in 2010 and 40 
in the first three months of 2011 (Azinovic 
et al. 2011: 62). This data, while not compa-
rable, suggest that the number of incidents 
appears to have escalated when the political 
situation deteriorates and ethnic security 
rhetoric is on the rise. Bosnia-Herzegovina 
has been in a permanent state of political cri-
sis since the October 2010 general elections. 
The 2008 global recession degraded living 
standards, increased general uncertainty and 
ultimately contributed to an environment 
conducive to (inter-ethnic) violence. Since an 
important aspect of inter-ethnic dynamics is 
the propensity to attribute the cause of vari-
ous grievances—e.g. access to certain services 
or job opportunities—to one’s ethnic iden-
tity, a worsening economic environment is a 
potent source of discontent.
Compared with early post-war years, 
more recent incidents of direct violence 
have been aimed at individuals and subse-
quently received wide publicity. Inter-ethnic 
violence is most likely to occur during mass 
public events such as football games, public 
gatherings around religious sites and cel-
ebrations related to religious holidays. An 
unprecedented case of hooliganism moti-
vated by ethnic prejudice occurred in 2009, 
when a Sarajevo football fan was killed dur-
ing a match in the West Herzegovina town 
of Siroki Brijeg. In places where the political 
context is particularly acute (such as Mostar), 
sporadic inter-ethnic clashes are typical 
among the youth but occur less frequently 
than in the past.
Research conducted by Saferworld—which 
involved 240 focus group interviews organ-
ised in 46 localities—found that inter-ethnic 
violence is not a source of concern and that 
the public considers police response to be 
adequate (Saferworld 2012: 14). This could 
be interpreted as inter-ethnic relations 
no longer having the same weight in peo-
ple’s everyday lives because of improved 
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professional standards in the police force (as 
the logic of liberal peace intervention focus-
ing on institutional performance would 
suggest). However, Azinovic has shown the 
police to be absent, inadequate or—often-
times in the case of refugees—instigators of 
violence (Azinovic et al. 2011). Furthermore, 
the number of individuals involved in war-
time violence—including mass atrocities—
holding public office has undermined trust 
in the police force and ultimately proved 
to be a strong deterrent against the return 
of refugees. 
Refugees and displaced people have also 
had their rights infringed as part of the 
strategy to preserve the ethno-territorial re-
composition instituted during the war. Those 
who have returned to their pre-war resi-
dences—or desire to do so—have been denied 
due process in a blatant breach of existing 
legal entitlements (Haynes 2008; Jenne 
2010). The authorities have also systemati-
cally obstructed the transfer of pension and 
welfare claims across jurisdictions. An ethni-
cally organised—and in some cases openly 
segregated—education system has been 
another arena of discriminatory practice 
aimed at minorities. Underscoring the depth 
of inter-ethnic separation is the ‘two schools 
under one roof’ programme, in which stu-
dents of different ethnicities follow differ-
ent curricula, occupy different classrooms or 
attend school in different shifts. This system 
was introduced under the auspices of the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe in an attempt to encourage refu-
gee return by providing security for students 
of different ethnicities. There are some 54 
schools still in existence, located mostly in 
the three ethnically mixed Federation can-
tons whose governments refuse to close 
them. Ethnic segregation is particularly pro-
nounced among primary school children, 
where the right to a so-called ‘national cur-
riculum’ (a set of subjects including lan-
guage, history and geography) is frequently 
denied. In Autumn 2013, a high profile case 
attracted significant public attention. A 
group of parents and children from Konjevic 
Polje in Republika Srpska organized a pro-
test lasting several weeks outside the offices 
of the Federation government and High 
Representative in Sarajevo. Their demands 
included a national curriculum for Bosniak 
children and the right to participate in the 
school’s governing board; both of which 
had been denied to them but permitted at 
schools attended by non-Serb children. The 
significance of this case is not only that such 
discrimination continues but also that it is 
unlikely to be resolved internally given the 
tacit approval of local authorities as well as 
a general belief in the necessity of interna-
tional presence and intervention. Such prac-
tices coexist with other forms of inter-ethnic 
separation including the decision of parents 
to send their children to schools more geo-
graphically distant in order to avoid class-
mates of different ethnicities.
Job discrimination, particularly in public 
administration, is another prominent exam-
ple that feeds into inter-ethnic tensions and 
perceptions on injustice on ethnic grounds. 
According to the 1991 census, employment 
in public administration is ostensibly based 
upon an ethnic proportional quota system. 
In reality, there are huge discrepancies in how 
this law is implemented. A breakdown of pub-
lic administration employees in the Republika 
Srpska is illustrative (See Table 1 below).
According to available Federation employ-
ment data for 2011, Bosnian Serbs accounted 
for only 4.2 per cent of the total and 17 
institutions had no Bosnian Serb employees 
(Breberina & Popadic 2011).
The symbolic aspects of ethnic security 
politics are hugely important for explaining 
the social acceptance and continuing appeal 
of ethnic protection in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
These aspects have been extensively dis-
cussed amongst scholars, particularly in 
the context of ethnic identity construction 
as a cause of war. Enmity amongst Bosnia-
Herzegovina’s ethnic groups is also one of 
the most prominent micro-explanations of 
wartime dynamics and was effectively rec-
ognised as such by the General Framework 
Agreement (Weidmann 2011). However, little 
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attention has been paid to the use of sym-
bolic instruments in rekindling ethnic stereo-
types in the post-war era and how this affects 
relations in terms of security perceptions 
and attitudes to ethno-national politics. The 
production of insecurity through symbolic 
means takes a variety of forms and appeals 
to the respective identities of all three ethnic 
groups. This includes exclusion from public 
spaces by renaming streets, public buildings 
and even town names; the choice of public 
(national) holidays as well as the location and 
timing of memorial events; the prominent 
display of religious insignias signifying the 
dominance of one group over a certain ter-
ritory; an insistence upon separate television 
channels due to linguistic distinctiveness; 
and so on. There are other more subtle and 
seemingly mundane forms in which the idea 
of the ethnic state is refashioned and kept 
present in daily life, such as the inclusion of 
the wartime Bosnian Croat state insignia on 
utility bills and the use of the Cyrillic alpha-
bet to reaffirm ethnic identity in Republika 
Srpska. As a result, a ubiquitous dynamic of 
aggressive and defensive nationalism has 
rekindled awareness and fear of inter-eth-
nic differences. In reality, this affects wider 
understandings of social boundaries and 
territoriality that negates freedom of move-
ment and discourages interaction among dif-
ferent ethnic groups. In many places, there 
is tacit acceptance among the youth of ‘ours’ 
and ‘theirs’ coffee shops and clubs.
Although the discussion above provides 
only a superficial glance of the social reality 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it captures the intri-
cate and complex ways in which the ideas of 
individual and collective security mix with 
ethnic identity protection in the daily lives of 
citizens. While focus has been on illuminating 
the reality of fear amongst different ethnic 
groups and their perception of one another 
as plausible security threats, this should not 
eclipse the myriad forms of everyday interac-
tion and coexistence that evidence a desire 
for normality (Eastmond 2010).
Explaining the Paradox of ‘Ethnic 
Security’
The previous sections discussed the role of 
ethnic identity in shaping the relationship 
between collective and individual security 
and its subsequent contribution to ethnic 
security as social reality. These insights will 
now be expounded upon with available data 
on ethnic relations as well as a discussion of 
the broader socio-economic and institutional 
contexts in order to explain how collective 
and individual security are compromised by 
ethno-national rule in Bosnia-Herzegovina; 
i.e. the paradox of ‘ethnic security’.
Data on various facets of inter-ethnic rela-
tions are rare given the difficulty involved in 
researching the subject (Dyrstad 2012). Data 
on social distance as well as ethnic tension, 
fear and trust are inconsistent and rarely 
cover sufficient time periods to capture the 
dynamic nature of inter-ethnic relations. 
The only available data on social distance—a 
measure of relation to other social groups—
covering the general population ends in 
2009 (Puhalo 2009). While this study finds 
that social distance increased between 
2002 and 2009, disaggregation—over time 
and by ethnic group—reveals interesting 
inflections in social distance patterns that 
resonate with political dynamics during the 
same period. As discussed earlier, social dis-
tance narrowed between 2002 and 2006 but 
increased significantly thereafter as the polit-
ical situation deteriorated (Puhalo 2009). 
Bosnian Serbs Bosniaks Bosnian 
Croats
Others Total
Ministries 9,656 445 85 0 10,186
Municipalities 3,458 92 31 19 3,600
Table 1: Ethnic Composition of Public Servants in Republika Srpska, 2004. Source: Adzajlic-
Davidovic & Haskovic 2014: 58.
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Another important finding is that the dis-
tance between Bosnian Croats and Bosnian 
Serbs has reduced over time, which can be 
explained by respective political leaders 
unifying to better negotiate constitutional 
reforms. Concurrently, the social distance 
between Bosniaks and these two groups has 
increased. A more recent study of high school 
students reveals that social perceptions oper-
ate at two levels. At the collective level, there 
is a tendency to use ethnic stereotypes and 
refrain from inter-ethnic interaction while, 
on a personal level, ethnic factors appear less 
relevant (Puhalo 2013). Srdan Puhalo’s expla-
nation reinforces the observation that inter-
ethnic relations are influenced primarily by 
relations among political elites and how they 
are represented in public discourse. Gallup 
Balkan Monitor data shows that trust among 
the three ethnic groups improved between 
2006 and 2010 (GBM 2010). Given the ethnic 
enmity thesis, it is remarkable that interper-
sonal trust in Bosnia-Herzegovina appears to 
be greater than in other countries with no 
similar experience of war (Weidmann 2011). 
In research on ethnic tensions in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, 77.3 per cent of respondents 
reported no ethnic tension in their neigh-
bourhood while 15 per cent reported only a 
small degree of tension (Efendic et al. 2014a). 
Whatever deficiencies the above data might 
possess, it suggests that the pervasive ethnic 
fear touted by ethno-national elites is simply 
not evident. Recent polling data found that 
56 per cent of citizens favoured a society 
with no ethnic separation, which further res-
onates with qualitative research findings that 
ethnic issues are not the foremost security 
concern (Kostrebic 2014). The recurring view 
expressed is that employment, health, hous-
ing and other welfare issues are critical, and 
that a better socio-economic situation would 
improve inter-ethnic relations (Eastmond 
2010: 12). For example, those who are cur-
rently employed show a greater tolerance 
towards other ethnic groups (Efendic et al. 
2014b). According to Benjamin McClelland, 
the potential of ethnic voting and rule to 
institute privileged access to opportunities 
and services is an important factor affect-
ing both collective and individual security 
(McClelland 2013). Therefore, support for 
ethnic parties does not necessarily indicate 
ethnic tension. A more systematic analysis of 
voting patterns to establish the profile of the 
electoral base and party strategies would be 
a useful test of this claim. 
In interpreting the evidence generally used 
to support the ethnic security argument, it is 
important to reflect upon the broader con-
text. One relevant issue concerns repatria-
tion as a key pillar of the General Framework 
Agreement. This is a multifaceted problem 
that cannot be reduced, as it is often argued, 
to concerns over ethnically-based discrimi-
nation. What is often downplayed is that 
the reluctance to go back is sometimes 
related more to strategic calculations, or 
what Erin Jenne calls ‘the logic of spoils’, 
than fear of being a minority (Jenne 2010). 
Issues related to jobs, housing, welfare and 
healthcare—which also the concern the 
majority population—need to be resolved 
before a return may be considered viable. 
Given the absence of these conditions, refu-
gees who have started their lives elsewhere 
are reluctant to go back to their pre-war 
places of residence. Similarly, discrimina-
tion in public administration recruitment 
must be understood in the context of high 
unemployment. As the largest employer, 
the public sector has to reject a huge num-
ber of applicants for reasons that are not 
necessarily based upon ethnicity. Likewise, 
inadequate public services are routinely 
framed as ethnically-based discrimination 
by the minority population when, in reality, 
they are oftentimes attributable to a lack of 
financial and technical capacity on the part 
of relevant service providers. Although inter-
ethnic cooperation over common problems 
is—for a variety of reasons—absent, coopera-
tion nevertheless occurs when the public is 
sufficiently motivated. A recent example is 
the 2013–2014 mass protests over the pro-
posal of a unique identification number for 
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all citizens after a tragic death of an infant 
(Oslobodjenje 2013).
Going back to the symbolic aspects of 
inter-ethnic relations, it is important to 
understand their deeper implications on 
local understandings of real threats and dan-
gers. Public events designed to incite ethnic 
tensions often are condoned, or even spon-
sored by, political elites. For example, the 
municipal budget funded Orthodox holiday 
celebrations in Srebrenica and Bratunac 
(both sites of genocide) which turned into 
massive anti-Bosniak gatherings (Krajisnik 
2013). Although police were present at both 
events, they failed to intervene. Such exam-
ples are relevant in terms of what they tell 
us about trust in government, particularly in 
the case of minority populations. Research 
shows that minorities have more trust in 
their own authorities due to the ideology 
of—and exclusionary practices instituted 
by—ethnically-based government (Efendic et 
al. 2011). Greater trust in political authority 
is further diminished by the public’s aware-
ness of ethnic security as a strategy imple-
mented by elites to control access to power 
and resources (Azinovic et al. 2011). This 
recognition feeds into a general mistrust of 
government which is shared by all ethnic 
groups and seems at odds with the logic 
of ethnic security (UNDP 2009). According 
to Azinovic, institutional dysfunction is at 
the core of the insecurity among citizens 
irrespective of their ethnicity, a finding cor-
roborated in broader scholarship (Azinovic et 
al. 2011). Respondents to Marita Eastmond 
characterised their view of security as ‘pre-
carious’; understood locally as encompassing 
vulnerability, fear of the future, disempow-
erment due to socio-economic deprivation 
and lack of opportunity attributable mostly 
to poor socio-economic conditions and 
governance (Eastmond 2010). According 
to Kostovicova & Bojicic-Dzelilovic, weak 
institutions and pervasive corruption inher-
ent to ethno-national rule have turned the 
state into a source of insecurity for its own 
people, in contrast to the intentions of the 
international intervention (Kostovicova & 
Bojicic-Dzelilovic 2010). An arbitrary system 
of rule, which rests on informal arrange-
ments and extra-institutional channels, 
generates inequities that feed into a general 
mistrust at the interpersonal, inter-group 
and institutional levels (Bojicic-Dzelilovic 
2013). It also inflames perceptions of dis-
crimination and social injustice that, in the 
context of politicised ethnicity, can be easily 
interpreted as ethnically-motivated. If safety 
means the absence of conditions where indi-
vidual life is at risk, then ethnic threat is no 
longer a real or perceived threat at the indi-
vidual level. Local people consider the inher-
ent uncertainties of post-war social, political 
and economic dynamics to be the greatest 
threat and source of insecurity. In Bosnia-
Herzegovina, these forces have been ampli-
fied by complex governmental policy based 
upon an ethnic framework that has played 
into the hands of ethno-national parties as 
well as the ambiguous role of international 
actors in the peace-building process.
Conclusion
This article has explored how liberal peace 
intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina has 
produced a security gap, defined as a rela-
tion between collective and individual secu-
rity. One of the key questions asked in this 
research is why—given the ambiguous evi-
dence of ethnic threat as a source of insecu-
rity in the post-war period and the existing, 
robust institutional mechanisms of minor-
ity rights protection—the notion of ethnic 
security prevails in international and local 
narratives as well as international interven-
tion practices. In conceiving the security 
gap as a result of international interven-
tion, I am not attempting to qualify the rela-
tionship between collective and individual 
security in terms of distance, direction or 
‘levels’. Instead, I want to highlight that, in 
the post-conflict context of politicised eth-
nicity, the two are linked in complex and 
dynamic ways. In some sense, one can speak 
of a certain hierarchy of security needs or 
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concerns that are shaped by contextual fac-
tors and produce an ambiguous and shift-
ing relationship between the perceptions of 
collective and individual security. In Bosnia-
Herzegovina, international intervention has 
enabled ethno-national elites to actively 
manufacture ethnic fear through institu-
tional and symbolic means. The result is one 
in which an incline towards group security 
shapes how collective and individual secu-
rity coalesce despite the fact that basic needs 
remain unmet. This conclusion was reflected 
by a comment from one respondent, who 
stated: ‘We have to separate first so that we 
can come together again.’
The narrative of ethnic security remains 
ingrained in public consciousness despite 
wider awareness of its instrumental use and 
victimization by ethnically-based rule; a phe-
nomenon I have called the ‘ethnic security 
paradox’. However, as this research suggests, 
there are complex reasons for the contin-
ued endorsement of ethnic security. Above 
all, they concern uncertainty in regard to 
pending political settlement, daily economic 
hardship, expectations that the state will 
provide solutions, and the changing modal-
ity of international involvement in the coun-
try’s long term viability. As Günther Pallaver 
shows convincingly in the case of South Tyrol, 
‘security concepts are only successful when a 
variety of different forms of threats become 
increasingly improbable’ (Pallaver 2014: 8). 
In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, it appears 
that ethnic fear is an improbable justifica-
tion for ethnic security discourse. Instead, 
policymakers should refocus their attention 
on what exactly is being secured through ter-
ritorial demarcation in the context of post-
war politicised ethnicity and where and how 
individuals find security therein. 
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